

sitions as strictly apart as logic would require;<sup>2</sup> but credulity is stretched to the breaking point if a sequence of thoughts as incoherent as the following is to dispose of the practical virtues and in particular to disqualify the statesman and the warrior: αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἀσχοιο εἶναι, αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς (οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίγνουντο) (1177b7–12). Surely the entire parenthesis—and let us not forget that parentheses exist faute de mieux—is meant to exclude any thought of the πολεμικαὶ πράξεις as an end in themselves. Logic is satisfied if after καὶ παντελῶς we supply, e.g., <οὐδὲ ἐν αὐταῖς ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος> or <οὐδὲ ἐν αὐταῖς ἔχουσι τὸ τέλος>.<sup>3</sup>

Turning next to the statesman (b12) Aristotle makes the same two points: he lacks leisure and his actions are undertaken for ends other than themselves. This parallels the line of thought that we have reconstructed for the warrior.<sup>4</sup>

At 1177b16 ff. Aristotle recapitulates: εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ' ἀσχοιο καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν . . . (the activity of the mind is clearly superior in worth). The clauses here quoted summarize what has been said in b6–15, but in the text of these lines as transmitted in the MSS the *probanda* τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν are established only for political activities. To include warfare, the parenthesis of b9–12 must be given the function in the argument which the words themselves suggest and which logic requires.<sup>5</sup>

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2. This is probably the case in 1177b4 ff., where in a statement designed to prove the association of happiness and leisure (ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν), the previously applied test ("desired for its own sake?") continues to be operative.

3. These supplements combine homoeoarcton and homoeoteleuton. Less would suffice, and a proposal like <οὐδὲ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν> has the advantage of parallels close at hand in the text (see above). For the relationship between war and peace, being busy and having leisure, see also *Pol.* 7. 1333a30–b3, 7. 1334b2–10, and 8. 1337b26–1338a6.

4. Contrast the intellectual virtue which is held *μόνη δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι* (1177b1 ff.).

5. R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif in their commentary (*Aristote: "L'Ethique à Nicomache,"* vol. 2 [Paris–Louvain, 1959], p. 887) show that they are aware of the problem but their explanation ("pour prouver que les activités guerrières sont tout le contraire d'un loisir, A. montre donc qu'elles ne sont pas une fin") suggests mental operations too erratic for Aristotle, who is often elliptic but hardly ever illogical.

## PUTTING PRESSURE ON PLUTARCH: PHILOSTRATUS *EPISTLE* 73

πεῖθε δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ βασιλεια, τὸν θαρσαλέωτερον τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Πλούταρχον μὴ ἀχθῆσθαι τοῖς σοφισταῖς, μηδὲ ἐς διαβολὰς καθίστασθαι τοῦ Γοργίου. εἰ δὲ οὐ πείθεις, σὺ μὲν, οἷα σου σοφία καὶ μῆτις, οἷσθα, τί χρηὸν ὄνομα θέσθαι τῷ τοιῷδε, ἐγὼ δὲ εἰπείν ἔχω· οὐκ ἔχω [C. L. Kayser (ed.) *Flavii Philostrati Opera auctiora*, vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1871; repr. Hildesheim, 1968), p. 257]

The writer is allegedly Philostratus, addressing Julia Domna and telling her to persuade the long-deceased Plutarch to change his attitude. Either Philostratus is indulging in extravagant literary artifice, fully aware that Plutarch is dead; or the writer is a forger and a fool. Eduard Norden<sup>1</sup> had no difficulty in accepting

1. *Die antike Kunstprosa*<sup>2</sup> (Berlin, 1909; repr. Darmstadt, 1958), 1:381, n. 1.

the former: to ask someone else to hold a conversation with the dead is after all a natural extension of *εἰδωλοποιεῖν*. G. W. Bowersock<sup>2</sup> refused to accept that artifice could be stretched so far: "It is inescapable that the author of the letter thought that Plutarch was alive at the same time as Julia Domna." C. P. Jones<sup>3</sup> set out to supply the requisite parallel, and offered several extravagant cases of *εἰδωλοποιεῖν*, though he would have liked to find a precisely parallel case in which a living person is urged to use persuasion with a dead one. Such a passage does exist; and it also establishes the writer's *Urquelle* and intention immediately.

There is an unavoidable set text for sophists talking about the attacks of philosophers: Plato's *Phaedrus* furnishes all the proof we need. At 269A–C the deceased Pericles<sup>4</sup> is imagined as persuading Socrates and Phaedrus not to be angry with the sophists (a dead man persuades two living ones); and at 278B–D Socrates tells Phaedrus to pass on instructions (from the Nymphs!) to Lysias, Homer, and Solon. One living, two dead: Plato has softened the boldness of the figure by putting contemporary and ancient figures together;<sup>5</sup> his imitator simply drops the former. But it is the conjunction of ideas in both passages that is decisive. If Plutarch does not have a change of heart, he will receive an uncomplimentary epithet. This threat has been taken over from the same passage: if Lysias, Homer, and Solon cannot comply (by proving that their writings will stand up to the test of truth), they can only be called poets or lawgivers instead of philosophers.

Philostratus then has only to compress some amusing conceits from a canonic work. He exploits the *Phaedrus* with relish elsewhere: Apollonius of Tyana discourses with Demetrius the Cynic in the grounds of Cicero's villa (*VA* 7. 11)—to the sound of chirruping grasshoppers specially imported from *Phaedrus* 258E f. And Philostratus would be ending his letter as he began it, by alluding to Plato's restrained attack on the sophists: the opening οὐδὲ ὁ θεσπέσιος Πλάτων τοῖς σοφισταῖς ἐβάσκηεν fits the subject of both the *Phaedrus* passages in question: Plato's Pericles is not too hard on the sophists, and Plato himself is not too hard on Isocrates in the famous judgment which follows (278E ff.). It is worth adding that Philostratus rather enjoyed oracular references: he records Damis' bewilderment when Apollonius dubs an informer τοῦ Πύθωνος τούτου (*VA* 7. 37); and it is a natural part of a sophist's task to cultivate an oracular pose (*VS* 542; cf. 481). Nor was this kind of conceit unknown to imperial boudoirs: Lucian addressed Panthea, mistress of Lucius Verus (*Pro imaginibus* 24), mentioning ὁ πολίτης ὁ σὸς "Ὅμηρος, ὃν καὶ νῦν ἀναβιβάζομαι συναγορεύσοντά μοι, i.e., "I am going to ask Homer to persuade you not to be angry with me." Lucian continues ἐρήσομαι τοίνυν αὐτόν, before dropping the figure: Homer is alive and living in Smyrna! In the same way Philostratus is entitled to assume that Plutarch is available for consultation; this anachronism is deliberate and purposeful, and is no obstacle to Philostratus' authorship of the letter.

Once we accept that this passage is a conceit, I am all the more convinced that the text of the last phrase, *εἰπεῖν ἔχων οὐκ ἔχω*, is sound. Kayser retained the oxy-

2. *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1969), p. 104 (with bibliography, to which add M. Gelzer, rev. of Bowersock, *Gnomon* 43 [1971]: 273).

3. *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford, 1971), pp. 131 f.

4. Pericles died in 429; Isocrates, born in 436, cannot yet be making speeches (278A).

5. Plato has already prepared the way (*Phaedr.* 261B–D): Socrates appears playfully to equate Gorgias with Nestor, Thrasymachus or Theodorus with Odysseus.

moron, which F. H. Fobes<sup>6</sup> translated, "I could tell you, but I can't." R. Hercher<sup>7</sup> emends *ἔχων οὐ λέγω*, which is paleographically plausible, makes sound sense, and is a stereotyped way of expressing complacent reticence. But *εἰπεῖν ἔχων οὐκ ἔχω* simply means, "I am able to tell you—and yet I can't bring myself to!" Philostratus is after all a connoisseur of oxymoron: he was delighted with Apollonius' prophecy about Nero and the Isthmus (*VA* 4. 24): *τετμήσεται, μάλλον δὲ οὐ*. And we have to remember that here he is defending Gorgias. He simply cannot resist a *γοργιασμός* of his own to cap the example he has just been quoting from Aeschines' *Thargelia*: *εἰς Θετταλίαν . . . Θετταλῶ βασιλεύοντι πάντων Θετταλῶν*.<sup>8</sup>

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6. A. R. Benner and F. H. Fobes (eds. and trans.), *The Letters of Alciphron, Aelian, and Philostratus*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), p. 545.

7. *Epistolographi Graeci* (Paris, 1873), *ad loc.*; so now D. A. Russell, rev. of Jones, *JRS* 62 (1972): 227.

8. It is not so easy to account for *θαρσαλέωτερον τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ*. Does this expression mean "boldest of the Greeks" (Fobes, *Letters of Philostratus*, p. 545, after Hercher) or "too bold for a Greek"? Neither possibility is entirely satisfactory, but neither betrays the kind of ignorance of Plutarch required to substantiate Bowersock's argument. The whole letter has been taken up with showing that *τὸ σύμπαν Ἑλληνικόν* has accepted Gorgias: why should Plutarch be allowed to step out of line?

## WHO OPPOSES THEOCLYMENUS?

Both A. M. Dale and R. Kannicht, in their recent editions of Euripides' *Helen*, return to the MSS attribution *χορός*, i.e., coryphaeus, for the figure who blocks Theoclymenus' way to the palace after he has vowed to kill his sister Theonoe (1621–26). This is in contrast with the majority of earlier editors in this century, who had identified the opposer as *θεράπων Θεονόης* or *ἄγγελος*.<sup>1</sup> Three difficulties, however, result from using the coryphaeus. (1) *δοῦλος*, the only term by which the opposer is actually identified in the scene, appears to be the wrong gender to use in addressing the leader of a female chorus (192 f.); Dale and Kannicht account for it by reading the king's words at 1630 (*ἀλλὰ δεσποτῶν κρατήσεις δοῦλος ὦν*) as a generalization, where the masculine predominates even when the reference is to females.<sup>2</sup> (2) Nobody has ever offered a good explanation for the coryphaeus as Theonoe's defender.<sup>3</sup> (3) The staging requires the opposer to engage in hostile,

1. Editors are divided thus. *χορός*: A. M. Dale (Oxford, 1967); R. Kannicht (Heidelberg, 1969); *θεράπων*: G. Murray (3d ed., Oxford, 1913); G. Italie (Groningen, 1949); H. Grégoire (Paris, 1950); K. Alt (Leipzig, 1964). *ἄγγελος*: N. Wecklein (Leipzig–Berlin, 1907); A. Y. Campbell (Liverpool, 1950). Reference to Dale and Kannicht, hereafter cited by last name only, will be to the commentary found on pp. 165–66 and pp. 422–26 (vol. 2) of their respective editions.

2. Dale ultimately feels more comfortable emending *δοῦλος ὦν*; to *δοῦλος*; Xo. οὐ . . . ; (Wecklein), though the verse is faultless. Kannicht adduces four passages to show that a masculine participle, like *ὦν*, can take a female reference. But in none of his passages is the participle attached to a substantive. In two a woman speaks of herself. In another (*Bacch.* 17, 41–45) Theseus' remark, though primarily addressed to the seven maidens sent to Crete, can also include the seven youths: see D. A. Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry* (London, 1967), p. 437. The proof for a female reference in the fourth (Eur. frag. 413) is dubious: see W. S. Barrett (ed.), *Euripides: "Hippolytos"* (Oxford, 1964), pp. 366 f.

3. See n. 10.